Sensemaking reconsidered : towards a broader understanding through phenomenology by Sandberg, Jörgen & Tsoukas, Haridimos
Creative Commons Non Commercial CC BY-NC: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) 
which permits non-commercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original 
work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).
https://doi.org/10.1177/2631787719879937
Organization Theory
Volume 1: 1–34
© The Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines: 
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/2631787719879937
journals.sagepub.com/home/ott
Sensemaking Reconsidered: 
Towards a broader 
understanding through 
phenomenology
Jörgen Sandberg1,2 and Haridimos Tsoukas3,4
Abstract
We develop a typology of sensemaking in organizations that reconsiders existing sensemaking 
research by providing a more coherent and integrative conceptualization of what defines 
sensemaking and how it is connected with organizing. Drawing on existential phenomenology, 
we make the following core claims: (1) sensemaking is not a singular phenomenon but comprises 
four major types: immanent, involved-deliberate, detached-deliberate, and representational 
sensemaking; (2) all types of sensemaking originate and take place within specific practice 
worlds; (3) the core constituents of sensemaking within a practice world (sense–action nexus, 
temporality, embodiment, and language) are played out differently in each type of sensemaking. 
Furthermore, we elaborate the links between sensemaking and organizing, focusing especially on 
the connections between types and levels of sensemaking, and the consequences of sensemaking 
outcomes for organizing. Finally, we discuss how the typology contributes to the existing 
sensemaking perspective, outline methodological implications, and suggest ways of advancing 
sensemaking research.
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2 Organization Theory 
Sensemaking research in management and 
organization studies has been prolific and varie-
gated, especially since the publication of 
Weick’s (1995) seminal book on the topic 
(Brown, Colville, and Pye, 2015; Kudesia, D., 
2017; Maitlis & Christianson, 2014; Mills, 
Thurlow, & Mills, 2010). The mainstream view 
has it that sensemaking is episodic-deliberative 
(Maitlis & Christianson, 2014: 62–67; Weick, 
2010: 542–543): it is triggered by episodic inter-
ruptions of organizational activities, forcing 
agents to deliberately search for how to restore 
the interrupted activity. This view has been 
increasingly questioned, as research has revealed 
that sensemaking in organizations does not con-
sist of one, but of several different types.
One proposed type is “immanent” sensemak-
ing (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015: 23–24), which 
points to the kind of sensemaking that takes 
place when actors are absorbed in routine action 
(Guiette & Vandenbempt, 2016: 87–88; Introna, 
2019: 745)—namely, action that is habitual, 
ongoing, and non-deliberate (Dreyfus, 1995, 
2014; Wrathall, 2014). Two other proposed 
types are “second-order” (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 
2015: 23) and “detached coping” sensemaking 
(Guiette & Vandenbempt, 2016: 89). Although 
distinct, both portray a kind of sensemaking in 
which actors are variously detached from the 
organizational activity they try to make sense of, 
relying on explicit intentions and language-
mediated reflection (Dreyfus, 2014: 79).
The existence of different types suggests that 
sensemaking is not a singular but a variable 
phenomenon (Guiette & Vandenbempt, 2016: 
87; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015: 9; Schildt, 
Mantere, & Cornelissen, 2019). This is further 
supported by recent reviews and contributions 
(Cunliffe & Coupland, 2012; Holt & 
Cornelissen, 2014; Kudesia, 2017), which high-
light that key constituents of sensemaking, such 
as sense, embodiment, temporality, and lan-
guage, vary empirically and conceptually. 
Treating sensemaking as a uniform “umbrella 
construct” (Hirsch & Levin, 1999; Kudesia, 
2017: 6) may therefore obscure its different 
meanings and usages within management and 
organization studies and reduce “construct 
clarity” (Suddaby, 2010). This is problematic as 
it makes it difficult to evaluate or coherently 
integrate research findings from sensemaking 
studies, something that Maitlis and Christianson 
(2014) have noted in their review.
The variation in views may be partly 
accounted for by differences in the theoretical 
approach adopted to the study of sensemaking. 
As several reviews have shown, two main theo-
retical approaches are used—namely, cognitiv-
ism and constructionism (Maitlis & Christianson, 
2014; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015; see also 
Maitlis, 2005: 21). For cognitivists, sensemaking 
is a process of interpreting stimuli and construct-
ing cognitive frames and mental schemata 
(Elsbach, Barr, & Hargadon, 2005; Weick, 1995: 
111). For constructionists, sensemaking is a lan-
guage-mediated process of interpreting others’ 
accounts and negotiating shared understandings 
(Boje, 2014; Brown, Stacey, & Nandhakumar, 
2008; Gephart, 1993). Accordingly, sensemak-
ing research is oriented towards studying empiri-
cal phenomena, in which, respectively, cognition 
or language use dominate. It should be noted, 
however, that the boundaries between cognitivist 
and constructionist approaches are permeable 
(Maitlis, 2005: 22; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 
2015: S26).
Although identifying different theoretical 
approaches is useful, it is not enough for obtain-
ing a more comprehensive and differentiated 
understanding of sensemaking in organizations. 
For example, in their laudable effort to recon-
cile cognitivist and constructionist perspec-
tives, Maitlis and Christianson (2014: 67) 
define sensemaking as “a process promoted by 
violated expectations that involves attending to 
and bracketing cues in the environment, creat-
ing intersubjective meaning through cycles of 
interpretation and action, and thereby enacting 
a more ordered environment from which further 
cues can be drawn.” Notice that even such a 
broad definition is implicitly predicated on the 
singular episodic-deliberative sensemaking 
type (“violated expectations”), thus leaving out 
the “immanent” and the “second-order” sense-
making types. What is missing from current 
attempts to grasp and define sensemaking more 
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comprehensively is a deeper exploration of the 
ontology of sensemaking.
Such an exploration is critical because the 
ontology underlying prevailing sensemaking 
research privileges an ontological split between 
subjects and the world, which makes it too nar-
row for investigating and grasping sensemaking 
more comprehensively. The main problem of 
this ontological split is that it only foregrounds 
one particular way of engaging with the world—
namely that agents, in their deliberation, stand 
separated from the world (see Dreyfus, 2014: 
77–78; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011: 344–346; 
Wrathall, 2014: 2–3). What is left out of consid-
eration is the more fundamental way in which 
agents relate to the world—namely, their 
immersed and skillful engagement with it 
(Dreyfus, 1995, 2014; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 
2011. Crucially, standing separately from the 
world to deliberate is derivative from their 
immersed and skillful engagement with it 
(Heidegger, 1962/1927). Moreover, there are 
several ways of standing separately from the 
world (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011). Thus, if we 
are to understand sensemaking more compre-
hensively—that is to say, if we are to account for 
types of sensemaking other than the episodic-
deliberate type—we need to move beyond 
merely identifying different theoretical 
approaches, valuable though this is, to broaden 
the ontological ground of sensemaking. How 
could this be done? A more comprehensive 
account of sensemaking would need to be onto-
logically grounded on agents’ different ways of 
engaging with the world. Moreover, it would 
need to conceptualize with sufficient detail how 
each type of sensemaking is constituted and how 
they relate to each other. And, finally, it should 
provide the conceptual resources to explore the 
links between sensemaking and organizing, 
which have remained relatively underexplored 
(Maitlis & Christianson, 2014; Sandberg & 
Tsoukas, 2015).
Although some promising efforts for under-
standing sensemaking more comprehensively 
already exist, they do not go as far as they 
could. Grounded on Heideggerian ontology, 
Guiette and Vandenbempt (2016: 87) have 
sought to go beyond received—mainly cogni-
tivist—understandings of sensemaking by 
focusing on the “phenomenal qualities of 
sensemaking.” However, while pointing in the 
right direction, their argument leaves important 
gaps. First, it misses “second-order” sensemak-
ing (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015: S23)—the 
kind of sensemaking public inquiries typically 
do—thus omitting a substantial body of sense-
making research. Second, the different types of 
sensemaking are not conceptually described in 
detail, particularly how sense is created, and 
how bodily perception, language, and time are 
implicated in each type. Similarly, whereas 
Introna’s (2019: 745) observation that sense-
making is “not simply at the disposal of human 
subjects” but that “sense is always and already 
given and made simultaneously” is illuminat-
ing, particularly in regard to “immanent” 
sensemaking (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015: 
23-24), it needs to be fleshed out analytically: 
what does already-given sense consist of? 
Moreover, we need to know more about the 
kinds of sensemaking, which, while founded 
on sense already given, are nonetheless more 
explicit, depending on how agents relate to the 
world. Additionally, while Schildt et al.’s 
(2019) typology of sensemaking processes 
sheds much-needed light on power in sense-
making (the main focus of their exploration), it 
has an “episodic” slant and, therefore, a cogni-
tive-discursive orientation. As a result, the 
ontological subject-world split is implicitly 
maintained, thus neglecting sense that is 
already given (or immanent), while “second-
order” sensemaking (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 
2015: 23) is not considered.
In light of the above, the purpose of this paper 
is to expand the sensemaking perspective, by 
offering a typology of sensemaking that is broad 
enough to do justice to its diverse types. Such a 
typology will yield several benefits: it will 
increase construct clarity; it will show what each 
type of sensemaking consists of and how differ-
ent types are related; it will demonstrate how 
sensemaking and its outcomes are related to 
organizing; and it will indicate how future inves-
tigations and theorizing may proceed. For this to 
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be possible, in line with phenomenologically 
inclined organizational researchers (Guiette & 
Vandenbempt, 2016; Holt & Cornelissen, 2014; 
Riemer & Johnston, 2017; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 
2011), and enactivist cognitive scientists 
(Gallagher, 2017; Kiverstein & Wheeler, 2012; 
Stewart, Gapenne, Di Paolo, 2010), we will 
ground sensemaking on existential phenomenol-
ogy, as elaborated by its most prominent propo-
nents, Heidegger (1962/1927) and Merleau-Ponty 
(1962/1945), and their leading interpreters, espe-
cially Dreyfus (1995, 2014, 2017a). As we will 
show, existential phenomenology offers an 
ontology spacious enough to allow us to elabo-
rate the various aspects of each type of sense-
making, without privileging the subject–object 
separation, and show how the various types are 
related.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we 
briefly introduce basic concepts from existen-
tial phenomenology. Using these concepts as 
an ontological platform, we thereafter outline 
a typology of sensemaking, in which four dif-
ferent types of sensemaking are presented and 
elaborated through four core constituents of 
sensemaking (sense–action nexus, temporal-
ity, embodiment, and language). We then 
expand on how the different types of sense-
making are related to each other and to organ-
izing at large, focusing on three sensemaking 
outcomes—organizational stability, learning, 
and change. Finally, we discuss how the typol-
ogy contributes to the existing sensemaking 
perspective, generates methodological impli-
cations, and show how it may advance further 
sensemaking research.
Expanding the Ontology 
of Sensemaking Through 
Existential Phenomenology
As we indicated previously, the ontology under-
lying the prevailing cognitivist and constructiv-
ist orientations in existing sensemaking research 
privileges an ontological split between subjects 
and the world (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015). 
Taking this ontological split as the point of 
departure means that sensemaking is assumed 
to start when organizational activities are inter-
rupted in some way or another. Although Weick 
is ambivalent on this point (Sandberg & 
Tsoukas, 2015: 9), most researchers presume 
that actors create an initial sense of the inter-
rupted situation by first extracting cues from 
their lived experience of the interrupted activity 
and thereafter interpreting these cues as a way 
of developing a more complete sense of the 
interrupted activity through cognition or lan-
guage use (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015). In this 
way, sense and action are conceived by most 
researchers as sequential; sense is seen as first 
created in our minds, language, or social inter-
action, which we subsequently act on. 
Consequently, privileging the ontological split 
between subjects and world makes existing 
sensemaking research able to study only one 
type of sensemaking, namely episodic-deliberate 
sensemaking, an approach that is too narrow for 
capturing the variety of different types of 
sensemaking.
Hence, to make it possible to develop a 
sensemaking typology, namely for the diversity 
of sensemaking types to coherently fit together, 
we need to overcome the limitations imposed 
by the subject–object split within existing 
sensemaking research. Existential phenomenol-
ogy, through the work of Heidegger (1962), 
Merleau-Ponty (1962) and their interpreters, 
like Dreyfus (1995), Sheehan (2015), Blattner 
(2006), and Schatzki (2002), and, closer to 
home, organizational scholars like Sandberg 
and Tsoukas (2011), Chia and Holt (2009), and 
Riemer and Johnston (2017) provides a rich 
vocabulary to accomplish this.
In this section, we elaborate and provide an 
ontological platform informed by existential 
phenomenology. In the rest of the paper, we will 
consistently draw on this ontology to develop a 
typology of sensemaking by distinguishing 
between, and elaborating on, different types of 
sensemaking. We focus on four main ontologi-
cal categories that recent reviews of sensemak-
ing research have suggested to be constitutive 
of sensemaking in organizations (Brown et al., 
2015; Holt & Cornelissen, 2014; Maitlis & 
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Christianson, 2014; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 
2015): being-in-the-world, temporality, embod-
iment, and language. We will devote more 
space to “being-in-the-world,” since it is the 
most foundational category of this ontology.
Being-in-the-world
In contrast to traditional ontology, which views 
social reality through the subject–object relation 
(Mesle, 2008; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011), exis-
tential ontology stipulates that the subject–
object relation presupposes—is derivative 
from—our being-in-the-world. The concept of 
being-in-the-world highlights that we are always 
already immersed within specific sociomaterial 
practice worlds (hereafter for brevity: practice 
worlds)—namely, within relational ensembles 
involving people, objects, and tools—which 
give meaning to what we do and who we are. A 
practice world is a meaningful, purposive whole 
that specifies a particular way of being and act-
ing, in which embodied agents are immersed 
(Spinosa, Flores, & Dreyfus, 1997: 17–20). We, 
therefore, never encounter objects, tools, and 
other people as completely freestanding entities 
to which we, subsequently, attach a meaning. 
Instead, material things only become meaning-
ful to us “within an intelligible ensemble of 
other meaningful things” (Sheehan, 2015: 
117–118; see also Gallagher, 2017: 49; Spinosa 
et al., 1997: 18). For example, to a pilot flying 
an aircraft, a cockpit is not an array of externally 
related objects to be contemplated, as it would 
be for an outsider, but a meaningful unified 
whole that is available for action (Gallagher, 
2017: 49; Merleau-Ponty, 1962/1945: 137). 
Thus, the practice world that agents inhabit 
forms the primary meaning-giving background 
context against which people, objects, and tools 
appear as meaningful in the first place (Dreyfus, 
2017a; Seidl & Whittington, 2014).
Although inhabiting a practice world neces-
sarily involves a cognitively aided learning pro-
cess (Hodgkinson & Healy, 2008; Marshall, 
2008), “learning is made possible through our 
entwinement with our world, rather than in 
terms of a subject in relation to an object” 
(Dall’Alba & Sandberg, 2014: 106). Initially, 
newcomers experience a distance from their 
practice world, which is perceived as a set of 
contingently linked items (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 
2005). But as newcomers become immersed in 
their tasks, a “phenomenal transformation” 
(Polanyi & Prosch, 1977: 35) takes place 
whereby a new sensory experience occurs: the 
world no longer appears as a collection of con-
tingently linked items but as a meaningful rela-
tional whole that affords certain possibilities for 
action (Dall’Alba & Sandberg, 2014; Merleau-
Ponty, 2004: 61–63; Tsoukas, 2011: 462; 
Yanow, 2015: 279–283).
More specifically, our most fundamental 
way of engaging with the world is “absorbed 
coping” (Dreyfus, 1995: 69; see also Sandberg 
& Tsoukas, 2011: 344). Through it, we instantly 
respond to an evolving situation we are facing, 
as, for example, plant operators working in a 
nickel plant do when feeding a ball mill 
(Ribeiro, 2017: 187–189). It is only when feed-
ing the ball mill gets momentarily disturbed that 
plant operators start paying deliberate attention 
to what they do and switch over to the subject–
object relation, moving from absorbed coping 
to “involved thematic deliberation” (Dreyfus, 
1995: 72–73; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011: 344; 
Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009: 1352). If, however, 
the interruption is more severe and persists, the 
operators become detached from the situation, 
looking at it from the “outside”—either para-
lyzed (i.e., not knowing what to do) or viewing 
it as an array of discrete objects with causally 
related properties (e.g., how the various parts of 
the ball mill are connected). The operators have 
then entered a situation of “abstract detach-
ment” (Tsoukas, 2015: 65), although remaining 
within the same practice world, since their 
abstract analysis aims, ultimately, at informing 
their practical re-engagement with (i.e., restor-
ing the performance of) the activity at hand. If, 
however, the plant operators are unable to 
restore the dysfunctional ball mill themselves, 
needing to involve experts from, say, an exter-
nal engineering consultancy firm, those experts 
will look at it with “theoretical detachment” 
(Dreyfus, 1995: 79–81)—namely, they will 
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view the faulty machine from within their own 
consultancy practice world. The faulty ball mill 
thereby changes practice world—from the pri-
mary practice world of operating the ball mill to 
the secondary practice world of the consultancy 
firm trying to understand what is faulty.
Temporality
Following Heidegger (1962/1927), our living 
engagement with the world is temporally con-
stituted in that it inevitably unfolds in and 
through practical, chronological, and existential 
time (Blattner, 1999; Introna, 2019; Schatzki, 
2010; Spinosa, Hancocks, & Glennon, 2017).
Practical time, with its immediate and antic-
ipatory character, is constitutive of absorbed 
coping (Bourdieu, 1990: 80–81; Heidegger, 
1962/1927: 384). This is evident in sports 
(McGinn, 2008), but equally in organizational 
practices (Aroles & McLean, 2016; Kaplan & 
Orlikowski, 2013), such as when TV journalists 
anticipate and adjust their plans when new sto-
ries break (Patriotta & Gruber, 2015), or when 
medical professionals anticipate each other’s 
embodied conduct during an operation 
(Hindmarsh & Pilnick, 2007: 1405).
However, when agents’ absorbed coping 
gets interrupted (intentionally or not), chrono-
logical time (Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, & 
Tushman, 2001; Kunisch, Bartunek, Mueller, 
& Huy, 2017: 1009–1013; Schatzki, 2010: 205) 
comes to the fore—that is, time as a succession 
of past, present, and future (Spinosa et al., 
2017). For example, in strategy away-day ses-
sions managers make up strategic plans, stipu-
lating where the organization was, is, and 
should be in the future (Hodgkinson & Wright, 
2002; Johnson, Prashantham, Floyd, & 
Bourque, 2010). Similarly, in planned organi-
zational change, additional chronological fea-
tures include sequence, timing, pacing, rhythm, 
and polyphony (Bartunek & Woodman, 2015: 
168–171).
Ultimately, however, agents’ engagement 
with specific worlds is constituted by existential 
time (Heidegger, 1962/1927; Sheehan, 2015). In 
contrast to practical and chronological time, in 
existential time, the dimensions of past, present, 
and future take place not sequentially, but simul-
taneously (Heidegger, 1988/1928: 265–274; 
Schatzki, 2010: 27; Spinosa et al., 2017). For 
example, one’s sense of being a teacher is tem-
porally constituted by the simultaneity of past 
(I’ve been a teacher), future (I’m pressing ahead 
with being a teacher), and present (I’m being a 
teacher) (cf. Hernes, 2017; Introna, 2019; 
Schultz & Hernes, 2013; White, 2005).
Embodiment
Our living engagement with the world is not 
only temporally but also bodily constituted 
(Dreyfus, 2017b). For Merleau-Ponty 
(1962/1945), what we ordinarily take to be 
mental activities are constituted by bodily 
engagement with the world (Romdenh-Romluc, 
2011: 2). “Motor intentionality” (as opposed to 
mental intentionality) is Merleau-Ponty’s 
(1962/1945: 110) term for highlighting the 
unmediated, intentional contact between 
embodied agents and the world (Gallagher, 
2017: 77–79). He stresses that embodied agents, 
immersed in a practice world, operate in a 
“practical” (rather than a “geometrical”) space, 
which is brought about by agents’ learned bod-
ily movement (hence motor intentionality; 
Morris, 2008: 114–116). For example, a pilot’s 
eyes relate to flight instruments not as located 
in a geometrically configured panel but as usa-
ble in the practice of operating the plane; flight 
instruments are part of the practical space 
inhabited by the pilot.
Bodily movements within a practice world 
are “a finely coordinated ensemble of motions 
intentionally organized [. . .] towards targets 
that are to be meaningfully moved” (Morris, 
2008: 116). Merleau-Ponty calls such an 
ensemble a “body schema” (see also Yakhlef 
& Essén, 2013: 884–885). Body schemas are 
an inherent part of practical activity: they fur-
nish agents with a bodily readiness to antici-
pate important features of the world as, for 
example, medical practitioners in an anesthetic 
room do, anticipating the embodied actions of 
their colleagues (Hindmarsh & Pilnick, 2007: 
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1405). Yakhlef and Essén (2013: 885) remark 
that “the body schema manifests itself in the 
form of habits,” establishing “a stable percep-
tual background against which practitioners 
perceive and respond to changes and move-
ments in their environment” (see also 
Bourdieu, 1977: 659).
Motor intentionality comprises two dialecti-
cally related sides, the habitual and the expres-
sive (Merleau-Ponty, 1962/1945: 82). The 
habitual side consists of the body schemas 
developed—the ways in which the body has 
lived in the past (Bourdieu, 1977: 659), which it 
brings forth at each new present, thereby 
“already laying down the general form of a 
future it anticipates” (Langer, 1989: 32). The 
expressive side is the bodily sensing of the 
unfolding situation, making constant adjust-
ments to the particularities of the situation at 
hand (Dreyfus, 2014: 81). In this sense the body 
schema is never fixed, but dynamic and con-
stantly adjusting itself to emerging situations 
(Langer, 1989: 32). Moreover, the bodily sens-
ing of the world and the disposition to action 
are shaped by the “moods” (Heidegger, 
1962/1927: 179–182) that agents find them-
selves in (e.g., feeling elated, depressed, cyni-
cal, etc.)—that is, the affective way the world 
matters to agents (Flores, 2012: 61–66; 
Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008: 155–156).
Language
Acting in the world involves the use of lan-
guage: a semantic space is carved out within 
which distinctions are drawn, meanings are cre-
ated, and utterances are made (Dreyfus, 1995: 
63; Heidegger, 1962/1927). How language is 
used reflects the way in which agents engage 
with the world (Dreyfus, 1995: 65–66). Thus, in 
absorbed coping, language is used like all other 
kinds of equipment: performatively—to get 
things done (Cooren, 2007; Flores, 2012; Ford 
& Ford, 1995; Whittle, Mueller, Gilchrist, & 
Lenney, 2016). When, for example, a surgeon, 
in the middle of an operation, shouts “scalpel,” 
she uses language performatively (Blattner, 
2006: 103–108; Dreyfus, 2000: 317).
When, however, absorbed coping is inter-
rupted and agents shift to involved thematic 
deliberation, they start paying deliberate atten-
tion to what they do and, as a result, mental 
content emerges to various degrees, consisting 
of explicit beliefs, desires, and propositional 
attitudes (Gallagher, 2017: 78–79; Schatzki, 
2000: 35). The surgeon may now say “this 
scalpel is not sharp enough.” Again, no asser-
tion is made here but a primarily performative 
utterance is articulated, implicitly requesting 
another scalpel. In abstract detachment, how-
ever, after the operation is over, while reflect-
ing on the equipment used in order to avoid 
encountering similar problems in the future, 
the very same statement (“this scalpel is not 
sharp enough”) points to an abstract property 
(sharpness) and to the scalpel in a more gen-
eral sense than before (i.e., not only to this par-
ticular scalpel, but to this type of scalpel in 
general). Although still in a practical context, 
language is used here in a representational way 
(Dreyfus, 2000: 317–318), namely to refer to 
abstracted features of the object at hand and 
the regularities they imply (Gallagher, 
2017: 83–84).
Finally, in theoretical detachment, language 
has a “quantum” status—that is, it is used both 
representationally and performatively. 
Specifically, outside the primary practice world 
to which performative utterances are tied, lan-
guage is used representationally when regulari-
ties and causal relationships are ascertained. 
However, since representational language is 
necessarily constructed within a practice world 
(e.g., that of an accident investigation commit-
tee or a scientific laboratory), such construction 
takes place through the making of performative 
utterances. For example, to study the property 
“scalpel sharpness” in a research laboratory 
(i.e., in a secondary practice world), performa-
tive utterances are used within it, like in any 
other practice world (Latour, 1987). But insofar 
as the results of the study are communicated to 
the primary practice world of clinical medicine, 
this is done through representational language 
that states assertions (Dreyfus, 2000: 317; 
Tsoukas, 2015: 66).
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Summary
The existential ontological platform elaborated 
above consists of four basic key categories. 
Being-in-the-world is the most fundamental cat-
egory, stipulating that we are not primarily sepa-
rated from, but always already entwined with, 
the world through our ongoing engagement with 
specific practice worlds. Specifically, it high-
lights four different modes of engagement: 
absorbed coping, which is the most basic, fol-
lowed by involved thematic deliberation, abstract 
detachment, and theoretical detachment. The 
temporal category stipulates that our engage-
ment with specific practice worlds is inevitably 
temporal, as it unfolds in and through three basic 
modes of time, namely existential temporality, 
practical time, and chronological time. 
Embodiment stipulates that our engagement with 
specific practice worlds is necessarily bodily, as 
we are always engaged with specific practice 
worlds through our bodily senses, both in an 
habitualized and in an expressive way. Finally, 
language as an ontological category emphasizes 
that we fundamentally engage with specific prac-
tice worlds within and through the performative-
representational nexus of language.
A Typology of Sensemaking
Drawing on the existential phenomenological 
ontology outlined in the previous section, we 
elaborate in this section a typology of sensemak-
ing, which is summarized in Table 1 and further 
developed below. In brief, we argue that sense-
making necessarily takes place within specific 
practice worlds, of which we distinguish two: a 
primary and a secondary practice world. The for-
mer provides the context within which actors in 
organizations are accomplishing the organiza-
tional activities related to the primary task of their 
organization (policing, firefighting, manufactur-
ing, etc.). The latter provides a context for mem-
bers of inquiry committees or academics who are 
representing, reflecting on, thinking about, and 
explaining the accomplishment of organizational 
activities that are part of the primary task of the 
organization under focus (e.g., public inquiry and 
research laboratory). Sensemaking in the primary 
practice world is an ongoing process, shifting 
back and forth between three types: immanent, 
involved-deliberate, and detached-deliberate. 
Insofar as sensemaking takes place in a second-
ary practice world, it takes the form of represen-
tational sensemaking. These four types of 
sensemaking reflect, respectively, the different 
ways in which practitioners engage with organi-
zational activities—absorbed coping, involved-
thematic deliberation, abstract detachment, and 
theoretical detachment. Importantly, as we will 
further describe below, the different ways of 
engaging with the world shape the core constitu-
ent of sensemaking, namely sense–action nexus, 
in that a shift in ways of engaging with world 
changes the configuration of the sense–action 
nexus in sensemaking. Moreover, although the 
object is the same for all sensemaking types, 
namely organizational activities, each type serves 
a different purpose in accomplishing organiza-
tional activities, and, subsequently, what specific 
sense they generate.
Below, we describe each type of sensemak-
ing and its main features in terms of four core 
constituents of sensemaking: sense–action 
nexus, temporality, embodiment, and language. 
Specifically, we elaborate how these constitu-
ents are played out differently in each type, and, 
thus, give rise to substantially different types of 
sensemaking. It should be noted, however, that 
although we for analytical reasons present the 
different sensemaking types and their constitu-
ents as distinct, in reality they form a contin-
uum, overlapping with each other to varying 
degrees at different points in time and, thus, 
likely to be less discrete in practice. This is par-
ticularly true for the three sensemaking types 
within the primary practice world, which are 
shifting back and forth as organizational actors 
continuously vary their engagement with their 
organizational activities in response to a con-
stantly evolving situation.
Sensemaking in the primary practice 
world
Immanent sensemaking. It is the most basic type of 
sensemaking in organizations, and is implicated in 
agents’ skillful enactment and performance of 
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routine organizational activities. Immanent sense-
making is practical (Bourdieu, 1990) in that it is 
accomplished by agents sensorially grasping the 
meaning of an evolving situation (Carman, 2008: 
51; Matthews, 2002). It thus differs significantly 
from mere intellectual understanding, insofar as 
the agent is in direct bodily contact with the world 
rather than with its representations (Carman, 
2008: 52). For example, a student taking a seat in 
class does not wonder what the amphitheater is for 
or what a lecture is. She already comes to the class 
practically knowing what teaching is about and 
what the teacher’s and her roles are. In other 
words, since immanent sense is acquired and sus-
tained through inhabiting a specific practice 
world it is already meaningful (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962/1945: 52).
Immanent sensemaking is richly illustrated 
in Yakhlef and Essén’s (2013) study of elderly 
home care workers in two Swedish care organi-
zations. In carrying out their tasks skillfully, 
care workers spontaneously refine their 
responses, based on their sensorial and verbal 
experience of interacting with seniors. In the 
practice world they inhabit, care workers have 
become, through routine action, familiar with 
what they must do on each occasion, for the 
purpose of serving the seniors as best they can.
Sense–action nexus. In immanent sensemak-
ing, sense and action are not separate but merged 
as a single ongoing response to the particulari-
ties of the unfolding situation. This capacity for 
constant self-correcting while in action is at the 
heart of immanent sensemaking (Carman, 2005: 
69; Matthews, 2002). Practical sense is what 
enables absorbed practitioners to keep in tune 
with unfolding organizational activities as they 
are performed (Dreyfus, 2014: 90). This con-
stant tuning is clearly evident in, among others, 
the “flow” literature (Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, 
2014). In conditions of flow, there is no distance 
between practitioners and their activities—
they are all one. Similarly, Yakhlef and Essén’s 
(2013) care workers and Benner’s (1994) nurses 
exemplify well this “oneness” between agents 
and their activities. The respective practitioners 
feel their way around the situations they handle, 
habitually calibrating their responses by virtue 
of having been inhabiting a particular practice 
world and drawing on the sensory background 
it carves out for them. The sensemaker and the 
situation are fused together.
Temporality. Immanent sensemaking has 
two distinctive, but inherently related, temporal 
features: it is immediate and anticipatory. It is 
immediate because it takes place simultaneously 
with the accomplishment of the organizational 
activity in question, enabling practitioners to 
make instant adjustments to the unfolding situa-
tion. It is also anticipatory in that the practition-
ers absorbed in carrying out an organizational 
activity make anticipatory sense of how the 
present situation will unfold, enabling them 
to smoothly and skillfully accomplish it. As 
Yakhlef and Essén’s (2013: 890) ethnography 
shows, having developed “a feeling of what to 
do” provides experienced care workers with 
an anticipatory sense of where their situated, 
embodied interaction with seniors is going 
(Bourdieu, 1990: 80–81). Finally, the exis-
tential time of the specific practice world in 
question teleologically directs immanent sense-
making. The connection between past, present, 
and future sense experience is not causal but 
existential: experience, as well as the pull of the 
pursued end, hones and directs the skills that 
make the present sense possible. For example, 
what care workers do is critically shaped by 
their experience over time and by the purpose 
driving their practice world, “what is good for 
[elderly people]” (Yakhlef & Essén, 2013: 891).
Embodiment. Immanent sensemaking is 
mainly accomplished bodily. This is so because 
making immediate sense of the particularities of 
unfolding activities requires that the activities 
performed have “motor meaning for my body” 
(Mooney, 2011: 366). In other words, it is only 
because we have the world in our body sche-
mas that we are able to make immediate and 
anticipatory sense of the unfolding situation 
(Ingold, 2000: 353). More specifically, bodily 
sensing consists of a habitual and an expressive 
side (Merleau-Ponty, 1962/1945: 82), forming 
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a “sensorimotor gestalt cycle” (Fuchs & De 
Jaegher, 2009: 475). While the habitual side 
makes anticipatory habitual sense of the unfold-
ing activities, the expressive side makes sense 
of them adaptively and creatively. For exam-
ple, the habitual side of a firefighter’s motor 
intentionality towards extinguishing fires is at 
his disposal in each new situation, providing 
a general sense of extinguishing fires (Klein, 
2009: 88; Weick, 2007: 17). The expressive 
side enables the firefighter to constantly adjust 
to the unfolding particularities in each new fire-
extinguishing situation (Weick, 2009: 17).
Language. The function of language in 
immanent sensemaking is performative. When, 
for example, a flute maker remarks, “This is a 
clunky flute” (Cook & Yanow, 1996) or a ball 
mill operator utters, “Listen! The mill is hitting 
balls” (Ribeiro, 2017: 189), they all use differ-
ent kinds of performative language in routinely 
carrying out their tasks. The illocutionary force 
of such language (i.e., what effect it is intended 
to have) is to accomplish a task in the primary 
practice world of the agents.
The use of performative language can take 
the form of any combination of Searle’s (1969) 
speech acts: commissives, assertives, directives, 
expressives, and declarations (Flores, 2012: 
3–16; Ford & Ford, 2009: 98), depending on 
context and task. Thus, through commissives, 
commitments (e.g., promises) are undertaken 
(e.g., “I will cover the office for you this after-
noon,” Flores, 2012: 9); through assertives, 
empirically verifiable statements are made (e.g., 
“Well, everything is in order,” Yakhlef & Essén, 
2013: 891); through directives, requests and 
orders are given (a fire commander to his crew: 
“Get ready to go in [a house in flames]”, Klein, 
2009: 88); through expressives, emotions are 
stated (an experienced nurse for a baby held in 
the intensive care unit: “I don’t like the way she 
looks,” Klein, 2003: 16–17); and through decla-
rations, the world is changed to correspond to 
the propositional content of the utterance (e.g., 
“You are in charge”). It should be noted that in 
immanent sensemaking, even when assertives 
are used, they are not used for the sake of 
explaining something but for pointing out fea-
tures of the world that are relevant to smooth 
action. More generally, in immanent sensemak-
ing speech acts are used non-propositionally in 
the context of practical skills deployed in a par-
ticular situation (Dreyfus, 2000: 318).
Involved-deliberate sensemaking. This type of 
sensemaking emerges when the routine perfor-
mance of organizational activities is interrupted 
(by an unexpected or deliberately created event, 
an anomaly, etc.), which forces practitioners to 
shift from absorbed engagement to paying 
deliberate attention to what is going on in order 
to restore the interrupted activity. The distin-
guishing feature of involved-deliberate sense-
making is that, although the performance of an 
ongoing activity may have been interrupted, it 
does not lead (at least not initially) to a com-
plete standstill. Instead, agents typically con-
tinue striving to perform their activity but are 
now required to pay specific attention to it. The 
immanent sense that was previously brought to 
what they were unproblematically doing is now 
foregrounded and becomes deliberate (Chris-
tianson, 2019; Weick, 2001a, 2001c). Hence, 
involved-deliberate sensemaking is about how 
people make sense of ambiguous and problem-
atic circumstances while still striving to per-
form their organizational activities. The sense 
generated is contextual—trying to get a contex-
tual grasp of what is going on, aiming to restore 
an interrupted activity from the “inside.”
A typical case of involved-deliberate sense-
making is the successful landing of US Airways 
Flight 1549 on New York City’s Hudson River 
in January 2009, after the plane was struck by a 
flock of birds shortly after takeoff. Through a 
phenomenologically rich first-person account 
(Sandberg, 2000; Van Manen, 2014), Captain 
Sullenberger describes in some detail his senso-
rial experience, such as bodily sensations, the 
emotions he felt, and his coordination effort 
with copilot Skiles (Sullenberger & Zaslow, 
2009: 209–215). In an interview soon after the 
incident (Wilson, 2009), Sullenberger described 
how he momentarily considered and rejected 
alternative landing options (initially LaGuardia 
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airport and then Teterboro) before settling for 
the Hudson. His recovery effort was made pos-
sible by virtue of bringing to the troublesome 
situation an immanent sense of flying, acquired 
by his long membership of a practice world (as 
both a pilot and an investigator of airline acci-
dents), whose purpose, meaning, and back-
ground distinctions he had picked up 
(discursively, mentally, and bodily) as a result 
of his long inhabiting it (Rivera, 2009; Schatzki, 
2002: 87). Body schemata, practical and exis-
tential time, and the holistic grasp of the evolv-
ing situation are all important aspects of 
immanent sensemaking, which have a crucial 
bearing on involved-deliberate sensemaking.
Sense–action nexus. As the Hudson land-
ing case and Christianson’s (2019) research 
on medical teams show, in involved-deliberate 
sensemaking, sense and action are partly uni-
fied, partly separated. Sense involves both a 
spontaneous grasp of the meaning of an evolv-
ing situation, enabled by immanent sensemak-
ing (e.g., “normal engine noises” are lost; it is 
“eerily quiet” (Sullenberger & Zaslow, 2009: 
209; see also Wilson, 2009), and a deliberate 
understanding of the affordances of the trouble-
some situation obtained by probing into it (e.g., 
unable to restart the engines despite several 
efforts; judging whether LaGuardia or Teter-
boro can be reached). While inevitably pressing 
ahead in the midst of action, agents simulta-
neously look back to make sense of what the 
situation has come to mean, as a result of their 
previous actions (Christianson, 2019). Agents 
grasp what they are facing by seeing retrospec-
tively how the situation responds to their prob-
ing (Weick, 2001c: 463).
Temporality. The main temporal features of 
involved-deliberate sensemaking are immedi-
ate, retrospective, and prospective. It is imme-
diate since agents are still pressing ahead with 
actions, whose timeliness they must grasp (e.g., 
judge the right time to land the plane on the 
river, Sullenberger & Zaslow, 2009: 238), while 
making instant adjustments as they see fit (e.g., 
“keep the wings level,” “keep the nose up,” 
Sullenberger & Zaslow, 2009: 238). It is retro-
spective since agents try different probes in order 
to elicit responses, whose meaning they subse-
quently ascertain (e.g., “find the most appropri-
ate procedure for our emergency,” Sullenberger 
& Zaslow, 2009: 215; Teterboro is a possibility 
which, upon further examination, is ruled out). 
And it is prospective in that, aiming to restore 
a disrupted activity, agents form expectations 
about how the troublesome situation will unfold 
(e.g., “Once I turned toward LaGuardia, it would 
be an irrevocable choice [. . .],” (Sullenberger 
& Zaslow, 2009: 224). It is the ongoing spiral 
between looking back to construct a plausible 
account that provides temporary sense (e.g., 
both engines are lost; LaGuardia and Teterboro 
are unreachable) and acting forward to explore 
possibilities in the unfolding situation, which is 
the most critical feature of involved-deliberate 
sensemaking (Christianson, Farkas, Sutcliffe, 
& Weick, 2009; Colville, Pye, & Carter, 2013; 
Weick, 2001c: 460).
Embodiment. Involved-deliberate sense-
making is partly an embodied and partly a 
cognitive process. It is an embodied process 
throughout, insomuch as the body forms a 
sensorimotor loop with the people and objects 
the agent interacts with in the unfolding situ-
ation at hand. References to the body abound 
in Sullenberger’s description: his sensorial 
experience indicates that something very unu-
sual had taken place; his bodily sensations 
(Sullenberger & Zaslow, 2009: 211) made him 
affectively aware of the gravity of the situation 
(Sullenberger & Zaslow 2009: 212), while, at 
the same time, realizing that he needed to get a 
grip on himself (Sullenberger & Zaslow 2009: 
211) (see also Wilson, 2009).
Involved-deliberate sensemaking is partly a 
cognitive process in that agents pay deliberate 
attention to the contextual features of the trou-
blesome situation in order to find out how to 
restore the interrupted activity; they reflect on 
what previously was, for the most part, sponta-
neously (pre-reflectively) handled (Kudesia, 
2017: 10). Thus, Captain Sullenberger reflected, 
even momentarily, on whether he could make it 
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to LaGuardia or Teterboro and how to fly the 
plane to the Hudson. Without the habitual side 
of his embodied sensemaking, he would have 
been unable to identify the severity of the situa-
tion and the likely options available. And with-
out the expressive side, he would have been 
unable to identify the affordances provided by 
the uniqueness of the situation: the inability to 
reach nearby runways and the possibility of 
landing on the river (Sullenberger & Zaslow, 
2009: 225).
Language. In involved-deliberate sensemak-
ing, language, in so far as it is used, is mostly 
performatively applied. Captain Sullenberger, 
for example, indicates that at times he coordi-
nated with the copilot even without speaking 
(Sullenberger & Zaslow, 2009: 215), not need-
ing to verbalize their common awareness of the 
situation (Sullenberger & Zaslow, 2009: 212). 
But when applied, language is mainly used in a 
performative manner (Weick, 2001d: 135–137). 
Throughout the incident Sullenberger, the 
copilot, and the traffic controller exchanged 
performative utterances, mostly in the form 
of assertives (“birds,” Sullenberger & Zaslow, 
2009: 207; “Loss of thrust on both engines,” 
Sullenberger & Zaslow, 2009: 215), directives 
(“Get the QRH [Quick Reference Handbook]” 
(Sullenberger & Zaslow, 2009: 215), expres-
sives (“Oh, shit,” Sullenberger & Zaslow, 2009: 
207), and declarations (Sullenberger to traffic 
controller: “We’re gonna be in the Hudson,” 
Sullenberger and Zaslow, 2009: 230).
Detached-deliberate sensemaking. If the inter-
rupted organizational activity persists, gets 
worse, or, in some extraordinary situations, 
even comes to a standstill, agents shift, while 
still located within their primary practice world, 
to an abstract-detached way of engaging with 
their activities, leading to the detached-deliber-
ate type of sensemaking. Sensemaking, then, 
becomes mainly cognitive-discursive and it 
involves engaged abstraction that generates 
conceptual sense of the troublesome activity. Its 
main feature is that agents re-view the key fea-
tures of the troublesome activity from 
the “outside,” reflecting on, and looking for, 
patterns of relationships, while remaining 
embedded in their primary practice world. As 
several review papers have shown (Brown 
et al., 2015; Kudesia, 2017; Maitlis & Chris-
tianson, 2014; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015), the 
detached-deliberate type has attracted signifi-
cant interest in empirically oriented sensemak-
ing research (although it does not use this term).
Studies that explore detached-deliberate 
sensemaking are typically of two kinds. One 
kind focuses on unexpected temporary disorien-
tation. It occurs when the organization experi-
ences a sudden and highly disruptive incident 
(Gephart, 1984; Weick, 1988), which it needs to 
come to terms with (e.g., a major failure or acci-
dent). A second kind, far more common in 
organizations, focuses on intended distancia-
tion. Here, the purpose is to deliberately disrupt 
participants’ immersion in their habitual organi-
zational activities (Luscher & Lewis, 2008; 
Pratt, 2000) and shift them into a detached mode 
of engagement with their organization, in order 
to investigate it from the “outside”—namely, to 
view it as if it were an object of study, whose 
properties might be dissected and discussed, and 
plans drafted (Tsoukas, 2017: 69). Such deliber-
ate disruptions include setting up strategizing 
episodes (Hodgkinson & Wright, 2002; Hendry 
& Seidl, 2003; Johnson et al., 2010), organiza-
tional development and change-related events 
(Bartunek & Woodman, 2015), participative 
consulting (Cooperrider, Whitney & Stavros, 
2008; Schein, 2016), and debriefing sessions 
(Ron, Lipshitz, & Popper, 2006).
Both kinds of detached-deliberate sense-
making bring about “cognitive disorder” 
(Balogun & Johnson, 2004: 524; Balogun, 
Bartunek, & Do, 2015: 960; Luscher & Lewis, 
2008: 221) and anxiety (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 
2010; Stein, 2004), since what agents have 
taken for granted, which has enabled them to 
engage immanently with their tasks, now breaks 
down (Barry & Meisiek, 2010). As several 
studies have shown over the years (Balogun 
et al., 2015; Bartunek, 1984; Bartunek, Balogun, 
& Do, 2011; Michel, 2014), when established 
meanings are disrupted, experiences of 
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ambiguity intensify (Luscher & Lewis, 2008: 
222). As a result, managers need to “under-
stand, interpret, and create sense for themselves 
and others of their changing organizational con-
text and surroundings” (Rouleau & Balogun, 
2011: 955; see also Balogun & Johnson, 2004; 
Bartunek et al., 2011), making sensemaking 
both vital and difficult to accomplish.
Sense–action nexus. In detached-deliberate 
sensemaking, the subject–object separation is 
foregrounded (something which is not experi-
enced when agents are immersed in the routine 
flow of their practice world), converting agents 
to Cartesian subjects seeking to conceptualize 
objects and, subsequently, creating a momen-
tary separation between sense and action. 
Sensemaking then becomes primarily interpre-
tation, and sense amounts to intellectual under-
standing (conceptual sense), involving mainly 
cognition and representational language. For 
example, in Luscher and Lewis’s (2008) study 
of strategic change at Lego, such an object of 
attention is managers’ felt experiences of diver-
gence between old and new interpretive sche-
mata; and in Hodgkinson and Wright’s (2002) 
strategizing episode, the object is the organiza-
tion at large, whose strengths, weaknesses, and 
prospects participants are invited to reflect on. 
In all these cases, agents’ particular experiences 
are foregrounded, against the background of 
their total organizational experiences.
Temporality. Since, in detached-deliberate 
sensemaking, agents focus upon a distinct expe-
rience, they thematize its temporality, becom-
ing aware of the past and the projected future. 
Detached-deliberate sensemaking is thereby 
predominantly defined through the retrospec-
tive–prospective temporal dimensions. Time is 
no longer practical, as it would be when their 
experiences were not thematized (see Csik-
szentmihalyi, 2014; Yakhlef & Essén, 2013), 
but pragmatically chronological, whereby the 
temporal continuum is split into the familiar 
regions of past, present, and future, in order 
for past patterns of action to be reflected on 
and future action to be envisaged and planned. 
Organizational members tend to think more 
explicitly about “how we/I used to be” and, 
if prompted, “how we/I want to be” (see, for 
example, the studies by Balogun et al., 2015; 
Luscher & Lewis, 2008).
Embodiment. Since detached-deliberate sense-
making is primarily cognitive, the body, although 
implicated, is accorded a secondary role. Interpre-
tive schemata, cognitive categories, and reasoning 
procedures are explicitly mobilized for making 
conceptual sense. For example, in post-flight 
reviews in a fighter aircraft squadron, pilots focus 
on what happened during their sorties in order to 
improve performance in the future, thus turning 
their first-person experience of flying aircrafts 
into an object of analysis (see Ron et al., 2006). 
Similarly, when a group of executives analyzes 
the pros and cons of their organization’s current 
business model, they turn the latter into an object 
of study, with the body having a background role 
(Hodgkinson, Whittington, Johnson, & Schwarz, 
2006; Rouleau, 2005). Although in each case their 
first-person experience of, respectively, flying an 
aircraft or enacting a business model is bodily 
grounded, the body takes the back seat, insofar as 
agents’ experience is thematized and objectified.
Language. In detached-deliberate sensemak-
ing, language is used for talking about activi-
ties, rather than performing activities. In other 
words, language is mainly used representation-
ally for identifying and relating properties in 
objects (Dreyfus, 2000: 316). Agents’ mental 
content thereby acquires a quasi-propositional 
character, albeit they are still involved in their 
own practice world (Dreyfus, 2000: 316–317). 
Thus, Lego managers’ felt experience of diver-
gence between old and new interpretive sche-
mata is no longer a situational feature (Dreyfus, 
2000: 316) of the work lives of particular peo-
ple but an abstract property that transcends 
specific individuals. Quasi-propositional asser-
tions are thus made about “divergence,” which 
has now become a thematized object, outside 
any local situation.
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Sensemaking in the secondary 
practice world
Representational sensemaking. The last type of 
sensemaking is representational. What, above all, 
sets it apart from the previous types is that it takes 
place in a secondary practice world—that is, in a 
context other than that in which the primary task 
of the organization normally takes place. Specifi-
cally, representational sensemaking “de-worlds” 
(Dreyfus, 2000: 317) a particular situation (e.g., a 
major organizational accident or failure) from its 
primary practice world and reinserts it into a sec-
ondary practice world (e.g., an independent 
inquiry committee). Such sensemaking is repre-
sentational since the targeted (i.e., problematic or 
problematized) organizational activity is 
abstracted from its original context, recon-
structed, and interpreted within the practical con-
cerns of another practice world (Gallagher, 2017: 
83–84). Thus, the sense generated is “spectato-
rial” (Dreyfus, 2014: 100)—that is, sense is made 
by disengaged agents, members of another prac-
tice world, with the purpose of explaining the tar-
geted activity from outside (that is, suggesting the 
causal mechanisms that generated an event or a 
regularity of events; Elster, 2007; Reason, 1991, 
2008). Importantly, in representational sense-
making, the agent–observer separation that is 
characteristic of deliberate sensemaking (espe-
cially detached) reaches its extreme. As external 
observers, representational sensemakers inquire 
about events and activities that took place in 
another practice world. As agents, however, the 
account they construct is produced from within 
the particular practice world they inhabit.
We distinguish two secondary practice 
worlds for representational sensemaking: pub-
lic and scientific inquiries. We will focus on the 
former since they have been a major part of 
sensemaking research. Typically, public inquir-
ies are set up by governments or regulatory 
authorities in the aftermath of a major organiza-
tional accident or failure, serving normally the 
purposes of accountability, learning, and policy 
making (Brown, 2000; Dwyer & Hardy, 2016; 
Nathan, 2004). Those inquiries typically 
address the question: what went wrong, why, 
and how can such incidents be prevented in the 
future? (For relevant examples, see the studies 
by Boudès & Laroche, 2009; Brown, 2004, 
2005; Colville et al., 2013; and Cornelissen, 
Mantere, & Vaara, 2014). In such inquiries, the 
object of inquiry (i.e., a failed organizational 
activity) clearly changes practice world: from 
the primary practice world within which it took 
place to the secondary practice world of the 
inquiry committee.
Sense–action nexus. The implications of shift-
ing from the primary to a secondary practice 
world are significant for sensemaking. Inquiry 
members’ sensemaking is spatially and tempo-
rally removed from the primary practice world, 
which results in their sense being completely dis-
connected from the action of the agents within 
that world. Specifically, to use Bourdieu’s term, 
inquiry teams adopt a “scholastic attitude” (1990: 
127–140), in contrast to the primary-world 
agents, who, immersed in their practice world, 
are imbued with a “practical attitude” (Bourdieu, 
1990: 130–134)—namely, trying to resume their 
disrupted organizational activity.
Although making spectatorial sense involves 
action (i.e., obtaining testimonies and laboratory 
findings, interrogating, discussing, etc.), that 
action is unrelated to the primary-world agents’ 
sensemaking. However, representational sense-
making is a practical accomplishment in itself. 
Thus, viewing inquirers as agents (i.e., treating 
the secondary practice world as if it were pri-
mary), their sense–action nexus involves mak-
ing spectatorial sense through the enactment of 
particular language games, in which concepts 
are used in particular ways (Rawls, 2011). For 
example, incidents under investigation are rep-
resented, framed, and inserted in particular nar-
rative forms that are deemed plausible in the 
practice world of the public inquiry (Bennett & 
Feldman, 2014; Boje, 2014).
Temporality. Since inquirers deal with the 
reconstructed workings of some failed activ-
ity, the time dimension that is mostly relevant 
is chronological time. This is because, in order 
to make sense of the troublesome organizational 
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activity, inquirers begin by listing retrospec-
tively the events and activities implicated (see 
relevant examples in the Piper Alpha disaster, 
Barings Bank collapse, and Hudson River acci-
dent reports—Brown, 2000, 2004, 2005; Aircraft 
Accident Report, 2010), while their recommen-
dations have prospective relevance. Moreover, 
since chronological time is removed from the 
primary context of the failed activity, it is treated 
analytically rather than pragmatically. However, 
viewing an inquiry team as agents dwelling 
within their own practice world involves all other 
temporal dimensions too, as in the previous three 
types of sensemaking. There is the existential 
temporal structure of the inquiry practice world 
that purposefully guides the enactment of its 
activities. There is also the practical time of the 
inquiry practice, such as its distinct rhythm and 
tempo that provide direction for the enactment of 
its activities (Bartunek & Woodman, 2015: 170).
Embodiment. Since representational sense-
making involves a primarily intellectual under-
standing, bodily sensations are less prominent 
than in the other three types of sensemaking. 
Mental activities—cognition and language 
use—dominate. As spectators of events that 
took place in another place and time, inquir-
ers cognitively assess and discursively ana-
lyze what happened during the episodes they 
explore; the subject–object split is complete. 
For example, the Hudson River accident report 
states events and, with the help of simulations, 
assesses both the action the airplane pilot took 
and the alternatives he considered (Aircraft 
Accident Report, 2010). The sense constructed 
is spectatorial. However, when spectatorial 
sense is viewed from within the secondary 
practice world in which inquiry activities take 
place, the body is implicated as in the previous 
three types of sensemaking, although its role 
is likely to be less prominent, since sensorial 
experiences tend to be more limited than the 
richness of those in the primary practice world 
under consideration.
Language. Several scholars have noted 
that the illocutionary force of public inquiry 
reports (i.e., the effect they are intended to 
have) is to restore trust and legitimacy and, 
thus, reduce public anxiety through rational 
analysis (Boudès & Laroche, 2009: 379; 
Brown, 2000, 2004). To achieve this, the 
inquiry report must construct authoritative 
claims that follow the rules of its genre, such 
as offering vicarious experiences to readers 
backed up by a solid argument (Brown, 2005: 
1583), through the use of language (Dreyfus, 
2000: 317) that includes empirically backed 
assertions (Brown, 2005). Objects and events 
are assigned abstract “properties” (Drey-
fus, 2000: 316), whose pattern of relation-
ships is to be explored. The language used 
in inquiry reports is thereby startlingly dif-
ferent from that used in first-person accounts 
reporting immanent and involved-deliberate 
sensemaking. For example, whereas Captain 
Sullenberger’s language is distinctly phenom-
enological (e.g., it highlights the importance 
of sensorial experience), the language of the 
Hudson River accident report is emphatically 
third-person, matter-of-fact, and abstract 
(Aircraft Accident Report, 2010). Assess-
ment and recommendations are provided 
through the use of assertives and directives 
(e.g., “The NTSB concludes/recommends 
. . .”; see Aircraft Accident Report, 2010: 86, 
passim). However, looking into the process 
through which such a report has been pro-
duced (namely, looking into the workings of 
the inquiry team as participants in their own 
practice world) will likely reveal the interplay 
of all speech acts and the choice of particular 
rhetorical strategies for enhancing plausibility 
(Sillince, Jarzabkowski, & Shaw, 2012).
In conclusion, drawing on the ontology sug-
gested by existential phenomenology, we have in 
this section elaborated a typology of sensemaking 
(summarized in Table 1) to account theoretically 
for the different types of sensemaking encoun-
tered in organizational research. Our main claims 
have been as follows. First, sensemaking consists 
of four major types: immanent, involved-deliber-
ate, detached-deliberate, and representational. 
Significantly, although organizational activities 
are the primary object for all sensemaking types, 
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each type is involved differently in accomplish-
ing organizational activities, serving a distinct 
purpose. Immanent sensemaking enacts rou- 
tine activities; involved-deliberate sensemaking 
restores interrupted activities; detached-deliber-
ate sensemaking re-views failed or problematized 
activities; and representational sensemaking 
explains problematic or problematized activities. 
Immanent sensemaking is foundational: all other 
types of sensemaking presuppose, refer to, and/or 
derive from it. Second, all types of sensemaking 
originate and take place within specific practice 
worlds: the sense made of an organizational 
activity (interrupted or not) is shaped by the prac-
tice world in which the activity is embedded. 
Immanent, involved-deliberate, and detached-
deliberate sensemaking take place inside the pri-
mary practice world in which the organizational 
activities in question are situated. Repre-
sentational sensemaking takes place within a sec-
ondary practice world, such as a public inquiry. 
Third, the core constituents of sensemaking—
sense–action nexus, body, language, and 
temporality—are played out differently in each 
type of sensemaking.
Sensemaking and Organizing
Having outlined a typology of four different 
types of sensemaking in organizations and dis-
cussed their main features, in this section we 
show how the different types enable organiz-
ing. As Weick (1979, 1995) has argued over the 
years, sensemaking enables organizing insofar 
as interacting agents strive to maintain, on an 
ongoing basis, a common sense of the activities 
in which they are engaged. Our typology sheds 
light on this process. Specifically, we argue 
that sensemaking is the logic of organizing in 
that it generates the sense by which agents cre-
ate and sustain coordinated collective action. 
We describe this by showing (a) how the sense-
making types are connected to different levels 
of sensemaking in organizing, and (b) how the 
outcomes the sensemaking types generate, 
especially stability, learning, and change, ena-
ble organizing.
Types and levels of sensemaking in 
organizing
Although the organizational context has been 
emphasized by Weick (1995: 69–76, 113–118), 
sensemaking research has mainly focused on 
individuals’ sensemaking. As a result, how col-
lective sensemaking enables organizing 
(Colville, Brown, & Pye, 2012; Weick, 1995; 
Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005) has been 
underexplored (Stigliani & Ravasi, 2012). 
Moreover, it has often been noted that the bulk of 
sensemaking research has not sufficiently dealt 
with how extra-organizational contexts influence 
the practice worlds within which sensemakers 
are immersed (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014; 
Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015; Weber & Glynn, 
2006). Below, we show how our typology makes 
it possible to correct these weaknesses.
Weick (1995: 70–71) usefully distinguishes 
three levels of sensemaking in organizing above 
the individual: intersubjective (agents interact 
to synthesize new meaning, i.e., agents negoti-
ate their different understandings so that a 
“joined” or “merged subject” emerges; Weick, 
1995:71); generic subjective (agents become 
substitutable in filling in roles and following 
scripts, i.e., agents behave in a uniform manner 
by following commonly available standard 
plots); and extrasubjective (agents enact taken-
for-granted institutional meanings, i.e., mean-
ings made available to agents through their 
participation in an overarching cultural order, 
e.g., concerning how markets function, the role 
of government, what counts as success etc.; 
O’Leary & Chia, 2007). Weick describes organ-
izing in terms of “bridging” (Weick, 1995: 73) 
the intersubjective and the generic subjective 
levels. Linking these two sensemaking levels, 
notes Weick (1995: 73–74), is accomplished by 
routines and their corollary—habituated ac-
tions. This is insightful, and our typology shows 
how it may be further developed.
To put it generally, by engaging in habitu-
ated action within a practice world, embodied 
agents learn to inhabit it and, thus, develop rel-
evant “body schemas” (Birnholtz, Cohen, & 
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Hoch, 2007: 317; Merleau-Ponty, 1962/1945: 
203; Morris, 2008: 116; Smith, 2007: 13–14) 
and “shared understandings” (Dionysiou & 
Tsoukas, 2013: 196–197; Sandberg & Targama, 
2007) that enable them to respond “spontane-
ously” (Kudesia, 2017: 23) to the challenges of 
their tasks (Dreyfus, 2014: 120–122; Gallagher, 
2017: 115–121). Members of a practice world 
become familiar with “prototypical” (Dionysiou 
& Tsoukas, 2013: 196) instances of their tasks 
and the affordances they provide (i.e., the 
responses they elicit) (Leonardi, 2011), as well 
as with deviations from them (i.e., “nonproto-
typical” instances; see Dionysiou and Tsoukas, 
2013: 196) and the actions they require (e.g., 
coping with a broken bag-valve-mask; see 
Christianson, 2019: 53).
Sensemaking at the intersubjective level 
occurs in an involved-deliberate or detached-
deliberate manner, when agents, while carrying 
out their routine tasks, encounter situational 
anomalies (i.e., nonprototypical cases), ranging 
from small to significant interruptions (intended 
or not), calling for a “synthesis” of understand-
ings (Weick, 1995: 71). Through involved-
deliberate sensemaking, efforts to synthesize 
meaning to restore interrupted activities occur 
within a particular context of action, as, for 
example, in the Mann Gulch fire (Weick, 2001a) 
and Christianson’s (2019) simulation teams. 
Such a synthesis is more likely to be effective, 
the more agents “heedfully” interrelate to one 
another (Weick & Roberts, 1993: 361). Through 
detached-deliberate sensemaking, efforts to 
synthesize meanings occur conceptually —
through “cognitive reorientation” (Balogun 
et al., 2015: 960; see also Gioia & Chittipeddi, 
1991) and/or “narrative evaluation” (Balogun 
et al., 2015: 976; Sonenshein, 2010). New 
frames or stories are worked out and new con-
nections between past frames or stories and pre-
sent cues or experiences are forged (Weick, 
1995: 111; Boje, 2008, 2014), sometimes with 
the mediation of outsiders who question the 
sense already made (Strike & Rerup, 2016).
Sensemaking at the generic subjectivity level 
occurs immanently, to the extent to which 
agents can substitute for one another in 
smoothly enacting a routine. Through taking 
the role of the other, in the context of routine 
action, individual lines of action are fitted 
together. Substitutability reaches its fullest 
insofar as the agent addresses him- or herself 
from the standpoint of the “generalized other” 
(Mead, 1934: 150–155)—namely, from the 
position of an abstract “they” (Blumer, 2004: 
61; Dionysiou & Tsoukas, 2013: 187). A generic 
self thus emerges, reflecting, at the organiza-
tional level, shared understandings and body 
schemas. In generic subjectivity, frames or sto-
ries cast in a cognitive/narrative form (see 
Balogun et al., 2015: 962; Weick, 1995: 110–111, 
130–131) together with shared body schemas 
(Bourdieu, 1977: 659) are developed, enabling 
coordinated action.
Sensemaking at the extrasubjectivity level 
also occurs immanently. However, unlike sense-
making at the generic subjectivity level, in which 
the generic self is defined by the organized con-
text of the joint activity, at the extrasubjectivity 
level, immanent sense is created by the “unobtru-
sive premises” (Weick, 1995: 114–115) provided 
to agents by extra-organizational (i.e., epistemic 
and institutional) practices (Hui, Schatzki, & 
Shove, 2016; Nicolini, 2011: 602; Schatzki, 
2002; Weber & Glynn, 2006). Specifically, a 
focally relevant practice world is nested within a 
nexus of other practice worlds (Hui et al., 2016; 
Nicolini, 2011: 6), which provide epistemic and 
institutional resources for making sense. 
Ideology, pre-judgments, and tacit assumptions, 
grounded on social class, national culture, race, 
profession, etc., become salient (Weick, 1995: 
114–116). Thus, for example, in strategy-making 
workshops, sense has already been discursively 
made through the very vocabulary (and associ-
ated meanings) with which strategy is consid-
ered (Ezzamel & Willmott, 2008; Knights & 
Morgan, 1991; Seidl & Guerard, 2015; Vaara, 
Sorsa, & Palli, 2010). That vocabulary typically 
reflects currently dominant values, concerns and 
ideologies, which are already discursively opera-
tive in particular institutional fields (Grant, 
Hardy, Oswick, & Putnam, 2004; Hultin & 
Mähring, 2017; Kornberger & Clegg, 2011; 
Whittington, 2017: 395).
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The performance of routine organizational 
activities—namely, in Weick’s terms, the 
enactment of recurrent behaviors—involves a 
variable mixture of sensemaking at the extrasu-
bjectivity, generic subjectivity, and intersub-
jectivity levels. Insofar as routine activities 
have been sufficiently practiced, agents have 
come across prototypical cases and, thus, their 
body schemas and shared organizational under-
standings are likely to have been well devel-
oped; generic subjectivity is therefore 
enhanced. In contrast, insofar as routines have 
not been sufficiently practiced, agents have not 
come across sufficient prototypical cases and, 
thus, relevant body schemas and shared organi-
zational understandings are likely to have been 
weakly developed. In this case, generic subjec-
tivity (and, therefore, immanent sensemaking) 
tends to decrease, while extrasubjectivity, 
through unobtrusive premises, becomes more 
salient (Danner-Schröder & Geiger, 2016; 
LeBaron, Christianson, Garrett, & Ilan, 2016). 
When, in either case, particular organizational 
forms and/or interaction processes impede the 
synthesis of perspectives, as, for example, 
occurred at Mann Gulch (Weick, 2001a: 
108–109) and in one of Christianson’s (2019: 
71–74) simulation teams, sensemaking at the 
intersubjective level is likely to suffer and, as a 
result, deliberate sensemaking (in either of its 
two types) is likely to weaken. The opposite 
occurs when interaction, either endogenously 
(Christianson, 2019: 63–65) or mediated by 
outsiders (Strike & Rerup, 2016: 898), takes 
the form of a “productive dialogue” (Tsoukas, 
2009: 944–946) or “heedful interrelating” 
(Weick & Roberts, 1993: 361)—that is, when 
agents generatively engage with one another 
(Kudesia, 2017).
Organizing depends heavily on sensemak-
ing, since it involves reconciling agent substi-
tutability with synthesized understandings. 
Specifically, agent substitutability, namely hav-
ing interchangeable agents follow standard 
frames or plots of action (i.e., generic subjectiv-
ity), is required for organized action to consist-
ently take place across space and time (Tsoukas, 
2019: 26–27; Weick, 1995: 71–72). However, a 
synthesis of understandings is necessary (i.e., 
intersubjectivity), insofar as substitutability is 
inherently incomplete, since human action 
occurs in open contexts in which new meanings 
invariably emerge (Tsoukas, 2019: 27–29; 
Weick, 1995: 73). Alternating between sense-
making at the generic-subjectivity and the inter-
subjectivity levels, namely between 
organizational frames and negotiated joint 
meanings, is the hallmark of “adaptive sense-
making”—that is, agents’ ability to revise their 
sense as the situation develops (Christianson, 
2019: 45–47; Cornelissen et al., 2014: 703; 
Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010: 565; Strike & 
Rerup, 2016: 882). In adaptive sensemaking, 
agents are less likely to be locked into a given 
or “entrapped frame” (Strike & Rerup, 2016: 
892)—that is, to be caught in a self-reinforcing 
loop (Christianson, 2019: 50)—when the “qual-
ity of [their] interaction” (Weick, 1995: 73) is 
such that the likely imbalance created by atten-
tion to either organizational frames or joint 
meanings is corrected by paying attention, in 
turn, to the other part (Tsoukas & e Cunha, 
2018: 395; Weick, 2001a: 117).
An illustration. To illustrate how different 
types are connected to the different levels of 
sensemaking in organizing, consider the case 
of the wrongful shooting of Jean Charles de 
Menezes by the London Metropolitan Police 
Service on July 22, 2005 in London (known as 
the Stockwell shooting; see Stockwell One, 
2006), insightfully studied by Colville et al. 
(2013) and Cornelissen et al. (2014). Both 
teams of authors underscore the cognitive 
dimension of sensemaking, highlighting 
“framing” and “cues.” However, our typology 
and the links we postulated between sense-
making and organizing enable researchers to 
see that sensemaking, on this occasion, 
involves more than cognition.
Specifically, the Stockwell shooting demon-
strates, fundamentally, a failure of involved-
deliberate sensemaking at the generic subjective 
level coupled with a failure of immanent sense-
making at the intersubjective level. The counter-
terrorist (CT) officers were enacting a new 
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routine (called “Kratos”), designed to tackle sui-
cide bombers, in the aftermath of the terrorist 
bombings in London on July 7, 2005 (Stockwell 
One, 2006). As Colville et al. (2013) and 
Cornelissen et al. (2014) make clear, the new 
routine the CT officers were following had not 
been sufficiently practiced and, as a result, their 
appropriate body schemas and shared under-
standings had not been sufficiently developed. 
Thus, the meaning of the fatal executive order 
“stop him” was ambiguous: while in the context 
of the old anti-terrorist routine, it had typically 
meant “stop and detain him” (which is what the 
designated senior officer, who uttered it, said he 
had meant), in the context of the new routine it 
meant “incapacitate/kill him” (which is what the 
CT officers said it had meant to them) (Colville 
et al., 2013: 1217; Cornelissen et al, 2014: 712). 
In other words, immanent sensemaking at the 
generic subjective level, in the context of the 
new routine, was relatively weak.
Moreover, when, as events unfolded, an 
interruption occurred—namely, when the CT 
officers started wondering whether de Menezes 
was indeed the suicide bomber they had been 
suspecting—doubts arose as to what they 
should do next. The different views required a 
“synthesis” (Weick, 1995: 71; see also Weick, 
2001d: 143) of agents’ involved-deliberate 
sensemaking at the level of intersubjectivity. 
However, such a synthesis did not occur: “a 
lack of prototypical past moments [prolonged] 
the search for meaning” (Colville et al., 2013: 
1215) (our italics). Moreover, in conditions of 
perceived time pressure and a police culture of 
command-and-control, in which officers’ inter-
pretations and actions had been expected to be 
“aligned with those of their superiors” (Schildt 
et al. (2019: 11), the CT officers failed to 
engage generatively with one another (includ-
ing their superiors) to loosen up commitment to 
the initial frame/story of de Menezes being a 
likely suicide bomber (Cornelissen et al., 
2014). Involved-deliberate sensemaking failed 
to be adaptive: the entrapped frame was not 
“punctured” (Strike & Rerup, 2016: 880) or 
“updated” (Christianson, 2019: 49–51) (see 
also Brown, 2018: 54).
Sensemaking outcomes and their 
consequences for organizing
A central question raised by the proposed typol-
ogy is: what kinds of outcomes does each sense-
making type generate, and how do those 
outcomes enable organizing? We address this 
question below by discussing three different 
kinds of outcomes: stability/renewal, learning, 
and change.
Organizational stability/renewal. Each type of 
sensemaking generates different degrees of sta-
bility/renewal of organizing over time. Given its 
strong reliance on the body schemas developed, 
immanent sensemaking generates a high degree 
of stability in organizing (Chia & Holt, 2009: 
131–133), ensuring “the active presence of past 
experience” (Bourdieu, 1990: 54). However, it 
may turn to rigidity, as it acts as a conservative 
force by pressing agents into reproducing exist-
ing ways of organizing. For example, Starbuck 
(1985: 354–355) has described how a worker, 
who had learned from experience to draft pro-
duction schedules, developed the capacity to 
estimate machine run times. When he was 
shown an equation he could use to produce his 
speed times more accurately, he declined to use 
it: “six years of habit and the frame of reference 
that went with it were too strong.” In other 
words, bodily inscribed tacit knowledge makes 
it harder to switch to discursively mediated 
change (Bourdieu, 1990; Hadjimichael & 
Tsoukas, 2019; Hindmarsh & Pilnick, 2007; 
Wright, 2019).
As involved-deliberate sensemaking is not 
only bodily but also cognitive in character, it 
potentially generates higher flexibility in, and 
adjustment of, organizing (Christianson, 2019). 
Detached-deliberate sensemaking, due to its 
predominantly cognitive and discursive charac-
ter, has the potential to generate a high degree 
of renewal, since it is not immediately involved 
in enacting the current way of organizing. 
Finally, representational sensemaking has the 
potential to generate an even higher degree of 
renewal, especially as it is not constrained by 
the tempo and urgency of organizing as 
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currently enacted in the primary practice world. 
However, given its disconnect with the latter, its 
outcomes are likely to have a more precarious 
impact on organizing in the primary practice 
world (Dwyer & Hardy, 2016).
Organizational learning outcomes. Crucial for 
renewing existing ways of organizing is organ-
izational learning (Guiette & Vandenbempt, 
2016), to which different types of sensemaking 
contribute. We will show how by using Chris-
tianson et al.’s (2009) study of the way organi-
zational learning took place at the B&O 
railroad museum in Baltimore through a rare 
event, namely the collapse of the entire museum 
roof due to a snowstorm, which led to the tem-
porary closure of the museum. Organizational 
learning took place between the closure and the 
reopening. While Christianson et al. (2009) 
describe the sensemaking that was involved in 
the singular (i.e., as detached sensemaking), 
we will show, through our typology, how three 
different types of sensemaking were impli-
cated, each producing distinct learning out-
comes in different phases of the museum’s 
organizational learning.
The collapse of the museum roof gave 
rise to intense detached-deliberate sensemak-
ing among staff: not only the museum’s entire 
response repertoires (e.g., stock of routines, 
habits, and roles in organizing) (Christianson 
et al., 2009: 847) were questioned and revised, 
but also its organizational identity (Christianson 
et al., 2009: 855)—namely, what kind of 
museum it had been and would like to be. For 
example, through their detached-deliberate 
sensemaking, the museum staff came to realize 
that the museum had been “operated like a uni-
versity, very much an academic institution” 
(Christianson et al., 2009: 855). This realization 
led to the development of a new conceptual 
sense of a museum with a more commercial 
outlook. Moreover, implementing this envis-
aged transformation required developing sev-
eral new routines and sets of skills, such as 
expertise in relating to media and large-scale 
event organizing. Involved-deliberate sense-
making enabled staff to simultaneously run the 
museum as normal (i.e., in line with its existing 
identity and routines) and develop a contextual 
sense of the new skills and routines required by 
its new direction. Finally, immanent sensemak-
ing enabled the museum staff to develop a new 
practical sense that fully embodied and routi-
nized the new skills and activities, thereby pro-
viding stability and constancy to its new 
commercial direction.
Organizational change outcomes. Different types 
of sensemaking allow for a better understand-
ing of organizational change outcomes. We will 
show how by drawing on Luscher and Lewis’s 
(2008) study of change at the Danish company 
Lego. In contrast to Luscher and Lewis (2008), 
who approach change only through one kind of 
sensemaking (i.e., detached-deliberate), our 
typology enables us to distinguish three types of 
sensemaking and see how each contributes to 
different stages of the organizational change at 
Lego. A similar analysis may be applied to the 
change described by Balogun et al. (2015).
In the late 1990s, Lego experienced rising 
competition and a stagnating market (Luscher 
& Lewis, 2008: 223), which triggered exten-
sive detached-deliberate sensemaking among 
its executives about how to respond. A central 
outcome was the idea to transform Lego from a 
hierarchical to a team-based organization. 
Specifically, the conceptual sense of the execu-
tives’ change initiative was “to implement self-
managed teams at every level and to integrate 
middle- and lower-level managers” (Luscher & 
Lewis, 2008: 223). The middle managers, who 
were both the target of, and agents for, this 
change initiative, “experienced intense pres-
sure to make sense of, and act according to, the 
organizational changes” (Luscher & Lewis, 
2008: 223) (see also Balogun et al., 2015: 
974–975).
In order to work out the executives’ concep-
tual sense of what the organizational restructur-
ing meant in practice, middle managers engaged 
predominantly in involved-deliberate sense-
making of the change initiative (Balogun et al., 
2015; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Sonenshein, 
2010). This enabled them to develop a 
22 Organization Theory 
contextual sense of Lego’s organizational 
restructuring in order to flesh out its actionabil-
ity: what new meanings and skills they needed 
to develop to make change work. In effect, it 
made it possible for managers to run Lego in the 
old way and, simultaneously, generate an action-
able sense of the new way of organizing. 
Similarly, our typology enables researchers to 
disentangle the “dual sensemaking roles” that 
Balogun et al. (2015: 975) identified when dis-
cussing the “dual change roles” of senior divi-
sional managers: as recipients of corporate-level 
executives’ plans, managers embed the plans to 
wider organizational change narratives (concep-
tual sense), while, as change agents, they embed 
change to local narratives (contextual sense).
Finally, immanent sensemaking enabled 
Lego managers to generate gradually a practical 
sense of enacting the company’s new way of 
organizing—namely, develop the body sche-
mas and shared understandings that provided 
stability in Lego’s new organization over time.
Moving on to representational sensemaking, 
the latter differs significantly from the other 
three types in that it is not internally but exter-
nally related to organizing in the primary prac-
tice world, and, thus, it is completely 
disconnected from the latter’s urgency, practi-
cality, and temporality. An illustrative case of 
representational sensemaking outcomes enter-
ing the primary practice world is Dwyer and 
Hardy’s (2016) study of the learning that took 
place during and after three large public inquir-
ies into bushfires in Australia. According to the 
authors, all three inquiries generated sets of 
abstract recommendations, which relevant 
organizations tried to implement. Dwyer and 
Hardy (2016: 59) call for more research to 
“examine the process of ‘transitioning’ out of 
the inquiry into the organization.”
Our typology enables us to analytically dis-
entangle the different types of sensemaking 
implied by Dwyer and Hardy (2016) and see the 
different processes involved. The transition pro-
cess from abstract recommendations formulated 
in a secondary practice world to implementation 
in organizations in the primary practice world 
starts with detached-deliberate sensemaking, in 
which agents, embedded in the primary practice 
world, try to make conceptual sense of what the 
recommendations may mean for their particular 
organization. This is followed by involved-
deliberate sensemaking, which enables agents 
to develop a contextual sense of the recommen-
dations—the new routines and skills needed to 
perform the new directives. Finally, a shift to 
immanent sensemaking will generate fluency 
and stability in performing the new routines 
through the development of body schemas and 
shared understandings.
In conclusion, based on the proposed typol-
ogy, we have discussed in this section how 
sensemaking enables organizing (as summa-
rized in Figure 1). Each type of sensemaking 
that occurs within the primary practice world 
provides the logic of organizing in that it con-
tinuously generates a specific sense (i.e., con-
ceptual, contextual, and practice) by which 
agents create, sustain, and change coordinated 
collective action. In contrast, the sensemaking 
outcomes generated by representational sense-
making in the secondary practice world shape 
organizing indirectly, depending on how 
abstract recommendations are received, acted 
upon, and finally turned to new routines.
Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a typology of 
sensemaking that reinterprets the existing 
sensemaking perspective in significant ways. 
Moreover, the proposed typology enables a bet-
ter understanding of the links between sense-
making and organizing. In this final section, we 
summarize our contributions and describe some 
methodological implications, while offering 
suggestions for further and new lines of inquir-
ies for sensemaking research.
Contributions
The typology contributes to the existing sense-
making perspective in three ways. First, it sig-
nificantly reshapes our understanding by 
providing a more comprehensive and differen-
tiated view of sensemaking in organizations 
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than the existing perspective. Crucially, the 
most basic and common of all types—imma-
nent sensemaking—has not traditionally 
received much attention, since the emphasis 
has tended to be on deliberate sensemaking 
(either involved or detached). Similarly, 
although representational sensemaking has 
been studied, there has been limited acknowl-
edgment of its distinguishing features. The 
typology helps correct these imbalances. In 
addition, our typology shows that sensemaking 
originates neither in cognition nor in social 
interaction alone, but in specific meaning-
giving practice worlds, which agents inhabit.
Second, the typology reconfigures existing 
sensemaking research in two major ways. As 
we showed in the two previous sections, the 
typology makes it possible to differentiate and 
reposition existing sensemaking research 
through the different types of sensemaking. In 
addition, the typology reconfigures existing 
sensemaking research by overcoming sev-
eral conceptual dichotomies (e.g., bodily– 
cognitive, retrospective–prospective, ongoing–
episodic, deliberate–immanent), opening up 
new paths for more integrative future research 
(Tsoukas, 2017).
Thus, grounding sensemaking in the mode 
of agents’ engagement with organizational 
activities shows that it tends to be (a) mainly 
sensorially (pre-reflectively) accomplished 
when agents engage in immanent sensemak-
ing, in the context of routine action (Wright & 
Manning, 2004: 624); (b) more cognitively-
discursively accomplished when agents delib-
erate (in either an involved or a detached 
manner) on what they need to do, following an 
interruption (Christianson, 2019; Weick, 
2001a, 2001c); and (c) even more cognitively-
discursively accomplished when agents, 
inhabiting a secondary practice world, engage 
in representational sensemaking (Brown, 
2000, 2004). Similarly, our typology helps dis-
solve the question of whether sensemaking is 
continuous or episodic. Sensemaking never 
stops (Weick, 1995: 43). The always-already 
character of immanent sensemaking (Wright 
& Manning, 2004: 638) enables us to appreci-
ate its irreducibly continuous character from 
which particular sensemaking episodes may 
emerge. The agents who skillfully engage in 
habitual action do not need a trigger to activate 
their sensemaking—sense is always-already 
made by virtue of agents’ immersion in their 
Figure 1. Sensemaking: the logic of organizing.
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respective practice worlds (Guiette & 
Vandenbempt, 2016: 86). Episodic sensemak-
ing (in its several guises) occurs on the back-
ground of ongoing immanent sensemaking.
Third, the typology helps renew the agenda 
for sensemaking research. It provides a broader 
range of options for conducting sensemaking 
research. Instead of being confined to studying 
only episodic sensemaking, the typology ena-
bles researchers to explore several types of 
sensemaking, how they continuously shift 
depending on agents’ mode of engagement with 
the world, and how they are connected with 
organizing. Moreover, it enables study of how 
sensemaking is shaped by the practice world in 
which it is situated. And in addition, by empha-
sizing the ongoing character of sensemaking, it 
helps us see the broader trajectory of sensemak-
ing—before, during, and after an interruption 
(Boje, 2008; Gabriel, 2000; Weick, 1995). For 
example, our typology makes it possible to 
explore how in-situ stories related to involved-
deliberate sensemaking (i.e., inchoate, action-
driven ante-narratives; see Boje, 2014; Boje, 
Haley, & Saylors, 2015) may become emplot-
ted, discursive objects after-the-event, thus 
helping shape practitioners’ identities through 
detached-deliberate sensemaking (Colville 
et al., 2012; Gabriel, 2000; Van Hulst, 2013; 
Whittle & Mueller, 2012). It also enables 
researchers to explore how public inquiry find-
ings travel back to the primary practice worlds 
they refer to and, how, accordingly, some of 
their findings are received and constitute “learn-
ing cues” (Dwyer & Hardy, 2016: 55), which 
reshape practices and engender action.
Methodological implications
The proposed sensemaking typology has impor-
tant methodological implications for sensemak-
ing research. Most significantly, the typology 
provides a broader ontological ground, which 
makes it possible to study the following empiri-
cally: all types of sensemaking; how the spe-
cific practice world significantly shapes agents’ 
sensemaking; and how agents continuously 
accomplish sensemaking. Moreover, a major 
implication is that the typology makes it possi-
ble to capture the duality of sensemaking in the 
primary practice world: that is, how immanent 
sensemaking takes place ‘inside’ organizational 
activities, and how deliberate sensemaking 
(involved and detached) takes place, to varying 
degrees, “outside” organizational activities. We 
expand on these implications below.
Since the typology situates sensemaking, 
even in its most abstract forms, in a relational 
whole—a practice world—that agents inhabit 
(Hui et al., 2016; Sandberg & Dall’Alba, 2009; 
Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011), an important chal-
lenge for researchers is to capture sensemaking 
from within its practice world. In order to do so, 
researchers need to approach sensemaking as 
an accomplishment—a process through which 
embodied agents, “always already entwined 
with others and things” (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 
2011: 343; see also Gehman, Treviño, & Garud, 
2013), undertake purposive, temporally ori-
ented organizational activities, often involving 
the use of language. The sensemaking-as-
accomplishment approach can be applied to all 
sensemaking types, although it is most visibly 
relevant for the study of immanent and 
involved-deliberate sensemaking, since these 
two types essentially depend on agents’ embed-
dedness inside the organizational activities they 
are enacting.
When studying sensemaking-as-accom-
plishment empirically, the emphasis is on 
obtaining “rich accounts” (Weick, 2007: 17) 
that aim to capture, as much as possible, how 
agents continuously accomplish sensemaking 
in carrying out their organizational activities 
(Nicolini, 2017). Rich accounts may be 
obtained by reconstructing sensemaking pro-
cesses through open-ended interviews and con-
versations, archival records, direct observation, 
and personal experience. Another way of 
obtaining rich accounts is through the use of 
real-time process data. These make it possible 
to capture agents’ lived experience of making 
sense rather than their “reported” experience in 
interviews (Samra-Fredericks, 2003: 142). 
Microethnographic methods (LeBaron et al., 
2016; Streeck & Mehus, 2005) seem most 
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suitable for generating real-time process data 
(Christianson, 2019) concerning how sense-
making is accomplished.
When the organizational activity carried out 
within the primary practice world gets inter-
rupted (intentionally or not), agents’ sensemak-
ing becomes less immanent and more deliberate; 
consequently, the organizational activity 
enacted also becomes an object of deliberation. 
Agents are still, to varying degrees, embedded 
“inside” the organizational activity they are 
enacting, while also retrospectively reflecting 
on the interrupted activity from the “outside” 
(Weick, 2003). In other words, the more 
severely organizational activities get inter-
rupted, the more agents make deliberate sense 
of them from the outside. The inside–outside 
duality of sensemaking, illuminated by the 
typology, implies that researchers can study 
deliberate sensemaking (especially its detached-
deliberate version) through either an etic or 
emic approach (Morris, Leung, Ames, & Lickel, 
1999; Van de Ven, 2007: 26–28).
An etic approach involves studying from out-
side the primary practice world (i.e., from the 
researcher’s perspective) how agents make 
deliberate sense of an organizational activity—
that is, how agents, prompted by researchers’ 
queries, describe the properties of their sense-
making, which researchers then abstract, seek-
ing to infer patterns of association. In such an 
approach, sensemaking is likely to be viewed as 
a relatively well-bounded phenomenon (hence, 
inclined to be seen as episodic rather than ongo-
ing), whose cognition-related and/or language-
use-related properties may be abstracted and 
their associations studied in a systematic man-
ner. Importantly, when using an etic approach, 
deliberate sensemaking is not presented to 
researchers as experienced by agents embedded 
in their primary practice world, but as it shows 
up in response to researchers’ queries (Dreyfus 
& Dreyfus, 2005: 781). In other words, research-
ers, through their queries, are “forcing out” the 
agents from their primary practice world, 
requesting them to make representational sense 
of their deliberate sensemaking of the problem-
atic or problematized organizational activity 
within the primary practice world (Dreyfus, 
2014: 166–167).
For example, in their study of sensemaking 
narratives, Brown et al. (2008: 1041) inter-
viewed actors in a software development com-
pany, asking them to respond to the questions: 
“What are the problems you find in your work?” 
and “What are the toughest decisions you have 
to make as a games designer?” From interview-
ees’ responses, the researchers were able to 
infer patterns in the individuals’ representa-
tional sensemaking narratives of their detached-
deliberate sensemaking of the problematic or 
problematized organizational activity and what 
they accomplished (preserving and enhancing 
self-esteem, impression management, etc.). 
Another example is Cornelissen’s (2012) study 
of the detached-deliberate sensemaking of cor-
porate communication professionals, who were 
prompted to reflect on (i.e., make representa-
tional sense of) their detached-deliberate sense-
making of critical incidents. Cornelissen’s 
model aimed to capture, ex post facto, snap-
shots of detached-deliberate sensemaking pro-
cesses (see, e.g., Cornelissen, 2012: 127). In 
both studies, agents were asked to report how 
they made detached-deliberate sense of a par-
ticular activity or episode that had occurred in 
the past, which was now foregrounded by 
researchers’ questions.
In contrast, an emic approach involves study-
ing from inside the primary practice world (i.e., 
from the agent’s perspective) how agents’ vari-
ously deliberate sensemaking is accomplished—
that is, how sense is created through agents 
using particular tools (Stigliani & Ravasi, 2012), 
especially language (Bolander & Sandberg, 
2013), and drawing on certain practices. Since 
deliberate (especially detached-deliberate) 
sensemaking involves some abstraction of the 
organizational activity at hand (be it a particular 
way of working, a strategy pursued, etc.), what 
can be fruitfully explored is how this abstraction 
is achieved, by focusing on agents’ performative 
use of language, authority, and tools (Cooren, 
2007; Taylor, 2016). An example of using an 
emic approach for studying detached-deliberate 
sensemaking is Samra-Fredericks’ (2003) 
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year-long research into a group of executives 
who were trying to hammer out the strategic 
direction for their company. Through audio 
recording and close-up observations of the strat-
egists’ talk-in-interaction in various meetings 
and workshops, Samra-Fredericks (2003: 149) 
was able to generate a fine-grained empirical 
account of how the strategists’ unfolding real-
time deployment of specific linguistic methods 
gradually generated an agreed “sense of the 
future.”
Furthermore, representational sensemak-
ing is the most abstracted type of sensemak-
ing, since it “de-worlds” (Dreyfus, 2000: 317) 
problematic or problematized activities in the 
primary practice world and inserts them into a 
secondary practice world. A central question 
here is how de-worlding is accomplished, and 
vice versa: that is, how the recommendations 
made through representational sensemaking 
enter into and are taken up by the organization 
concerned. Researchers who have studied 
public inquiry reports have usefully noted that 
the practical purpose of such reports is to 
“establish accountability, rebuild public con-
fidence, and restore an organization’s legiti-
macy where failure is evident” (Dwyer & 
Hardy, 2016: 48; see also Brown, 2000, 2004). 
How such objectives are accomplished, 
through the use of language and/or embodied 
interaction and objects, is of paramount 
importance for public inquiries, and this has 
received limited attention in sensemaking 
research (for an exception, see Brown, 2000, 
2004). Similarly, how public inquiry recom-
mendations are received by the focal organi-
zation—that is, the work that is necessary for 
recommendations to be contextualized and 
made practical—is an important topic to pur-
sue (Dwyer & Hardy, 2016).
Additionally, our typology proposes a 
“zooming in, zooming out” approach 
(Nicolini, 2009) to empirically study the rela-
tionship between sensemaking and its prac-
tice world. Zooming in means focusing on 
how sensemaking is accomplished at a local 
level (e.g., enacting a specific routine, such 
as pursuing a suspected terrorist); and 
zooming out means focusing on how that 
sensemaking is made possible and structured 
by the broader practice world in which it is 
situated (e.g., the broader practice of polic-
ing). This is important, since, as described 
earlier, sensemaking is directed not only by 
the specific purpose of the unfolding organi-
zational activity which it enables, but also by 
the purposiveness of the specific practice 
world to which it belongs. Zooming in and 
zooming out make it possible to empirically 
study sensemaking at these two levels.
Finally, one may ask what type of sense-
making scholars are engaged in when trying to 
make sense of immersed actors’ sensemaking 
in their organizations. Insofar as scholars study 
others’ sensemaking, they necessarily de-
world the latter and insert it into the world of 
academic discourse. Does this, then, make 
scholarly sensemaking inherently representa-
tional? Not necessarily. True, the distance 
between scholarly and practitioners’ sense-
making cannot be eliminated: sensemaking as 
experienced by practitioners is bound to be 
different from researchers’ sensemaking of the 
practitioners’ sensemaking. However, what is 
lost through de-worlding is potentially gained 
by offering practitioners the opportunity to 
elucidate what was necessarily opaque in their 
sensemaking (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011: 354; 
Shotter & Tsoukas, 2011: 328), such as the dis-
integration of role structure in Mann Gulch 
(see Weick, 2001a: 108) or the breakdown of 
coordination at the Tenerife air disaster 
(Weick, 2001d: 132).
To the extent that scholars conduct their 
research from within the framework of “practi-
cal rationality” (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011), 
they seek to emically grasp how sensemaking 
is accomplished by situating it within the 
“unfolding relational whole” (Sandberg & 
Tsoukas, 2011: 352) of the primary practice 
world. This is the closest researchers can get to 
capturing agents’ experience of sensemaking, 
and their account is therefore non-representa-
tional (Cadman, 2009; Dreyfus, 2009) and elu-
cidatory (Shotter & Tsoukas, 2011). For 
example, the richness of Maclean’s (2017) 
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empirical evidence about the Mann Gulch dis-
aster enabled Weick (2001a) to both grasp 
important aspects of smokejumpers’ unfolding 
experience and elucidate them, making mani-
fest what was previously opaque or implicit in 
smokejumpers’ sensemaking.
However, to the extent that researchers con-
duct their research from within the framework 
of “scientific rationality” (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 
2011), they become spectators of how sense-
making is accomplished within the practice 
world in question, and, consequently, sense-
making shows up to them as an object whose 
properties they seek to explore. What makes 
this possible is that, in agents’ variously delib-
erate sensemaking, the interrupted activity 
acquires the status of an object that is amenable 
to reflection. Thus, both the scholarly distance 
and the object-like experience of agents’ delib-
erate sensemaking make representational 
sensemaking plausible.
In conclusion, the typology suggested here 
significantly reshapes and reconfigures existing 
sensemaking research by providing a more 
coherent and integrative conceptualization of 
what defines sensemaking and how it is con-
nected with organizing. It thereby sharpens the 
focus and extends the scope of the sensemaking 
perspective; helps clarify conceptual ambigui-
ties; and enables researchers to better locate 
existing research contributions and develop 
new lines of research. Finally, the typology pro-
vides a methodological framework that makes 
it possible for researchers to see that what they 
identify empirically as sensemaking is not uni-
form, but critically depends both on practition-
ers’ mode of engagement with the world and on 
researchers’ mode of engagement with the phe-
nomenon at hand.
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